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REFERENCES 57 1. INTRODUCTION 
The question studied by this report is to what extent the adoption by 
industry of certain delivered price systems is compatible with the establishment of a 
competitive market in the European Communities. 
Spatial pricing systems typically use sales conditions Buch as "delivered" 
prices (where the seller takes care of carriage) or "fob" prices (free on board, where 
the seller sets a factory price and the buyer takes care of freight). In certain 
structural contexts, however, these systems imply rather more than the choice of a 
particular type of sales conditions : they can help to determine competitive 
behaviour. 
We shall concentrate on industrial structures where the adoption of a given 
system is apt to have repercussions - favourable or unfavourable - on the competitive 
conduct of the relevant firms. These are industries which produce relatively 
homogeneous goods so that there is perfect substitutability at a given place between 
the goods of one manufacturer and those of another. Furthermore, freight is a 
significant factor in retail price formation since the goods are of low unitary value 
and carriage is over fairly large distances. The origin of this last fact lies either 
in geographical concentration or in the small number of producers. In any case, 
bearing in mind this spatial differentiation, the number of competitors is low either 
because freight costs create a series of local oligopolies or because the number of 
produvers in the whole of the relevant territory is low. Finally, the price 
elasticity of overall demand in the industry is low, so that sellere have a 
collective interest in avoiding industry-wide price reductions. 
This, then, sets our reference framework. It is broad enough to take in a 
large number of industries, yet it is narrow enough to preclude abstract 
generalisat ions. 
After describing the price systems which are to be analysed (Section 2), we shall 
consider their effects on price competition in Section 3. We shall go on to seek out 
why firms find it worth adopting such techniques, both on a monopoly market (Section 4) and on an oligopolistic market (Section 5)· Section 6 will consider their 
compatibility with efficient spatial resource allocation and provides an opportunity 
to express views on the question of spatial discrimination. After an excursus on perfect 
markets (Section 7)1 we shall consider the conditions of market integration which 
might help to promote economic efficiency (Section 8) and regional development 
(Section 9). 2. SPATIAL PRICE SYSTEMS 
Let us attempt a brief description of the pricing techniques under analysis, 
highlighting their most important characteristics for the purpose of this study. For 
the sake of clarity certain aspects will be simplified : in business practice, 
specific circumstances often entail variations on points of detail. 
2,1 Zone prices (l) 
A uniform delivered price is applied throughout a given territory. When the 
unit transport cost is fairly high, and demand is concentrated at different places, 
a number of separate areas can be demarcated. Within each such area, a single 
delivered price applies to all points of delivery. An area might consist, for 
instance, of a member country of Benelux. Elsewhere it will consist of an economic 
region, a county or group of counties, etc., precise demarcation depending on the 
number and location of production and consumption centres, political borders and the 
history of marketing-sharing agreements. 
Between the areas, a rigid price difference is maintained, which means that 
buyers (dealers or the ultimate consumer) are prohibited from buying or reselling in 
any area other than that in which they are located (or which is allotted to them). 
There is thus a need for strict control of shipments. The simplest way of exercising 
this control is to ban buyers from handling their own carriage. Yet this is not 
essential : it may suffice to require payment of the delivered price (free at site, 
free on rail, free alongside ship, or whatever) applying in the buyer's area even 
when he obtains supplies in another area. In such cases, price gaps between areas 
must not exceed the cost of freight to each of the main centres of consumption, to 
exclude the possibility of arbitrage. 
(1) See Commons (1924, p. 505-508), Burns (1936, p. 282-288), Moller (1943a, 
p. 87-89), Mund (1950, p. 366-369), Herlemann (1950, p. 54-59), Report on the 
Supply of Chemical Fertilizers (1959, paragraphs 537 and 567), Phlips (1962, 
p. 201-218 and 265-268). Within each area, a ban on taking delivery at the factory itself ensures 
that the system will operate smoothly. Once again, however, more flexible 
arrangements may be possible : it is possible to go so far as to allow reimbursement 
(sometimes in part only) of freight charges where delivery is taken at the factory, 
but this presupposes a highly disciplined trade, strict control of destination and 
tariffs reflecting genuine freight costs. 
2.2 The basing point system (l) 
Sale from a basing point (point de parité in French, Frachtgrundlage in 
German) implies a delivered price equal to a base price plus the cost of carriage to 
the place of delivery calculated from a predetermined basing point, which need not 
necessarily be the place where the seller's factory is located. 
Consider a geographical area in which there are several centres of 
production. When all manufacturers calculate freight from a single basing point, we 
have what is called a single basing point system.(2) » When there are several basing 
points, we have a multiple basing point system. 
In the second case, the calculation of delivered prices can seem complex. 
What is the basing point for calculation of freight as regards a buyer at a specific 
place ? In the system which we are to analyse, the formula is very simple : at every 
geographical location, the delivered price to be applied is equal to the lowest 
combination of a base price plus freight to that location (from the different basing 
pointe to which the base prices relate). This formula is applied by means of the 
"alignment" rule. Let us take a look at this in more detail. 
The base price is the published list price applicable at a given basing point. 
The industry decides on one or mose basing points (for instance, a port such as 
(1) The best known works include Clark (1938), Moller (1943a), Machlup (1949), 
Stigler (1949), Kaysen (1949), Wagner (1952), Harbers (1953), von Beckerath (1954, 
p. 199-200 and 263-264), Erb (1956), Erb and Rogge (1958), Imkamp (1958), 
Justman (1958), Allais (1958), Demaria (1958), Fallon (1958), Loescher (1959, 
Chap, l), Zimmermann (1962) and Scherer (1970, Chap. IO). 
(2) Examples are the "Pittsburgh-plus", "Thionville" and "Oberhausen" systems applied 
by American, French and German steelmakers. 
10 Hamburg for foreign wheat imported by sea, or the city of Siegen for German-made fine 
sheet of ordinary steel, or perhaps even several cities, which may or may not 
correspond to actual centres of production). 
The freight to be added to the base price is worked out from a published 
tariff accepted by all concerned, such as a railway company's schedule of charges. 
For places not on railway lines or where the operation of official tariffs would be 
excessively complicated, the industry itself publishes (or asks the authorities to 
publish) a common tariff. 
All prices are delivered prices. The price to be charged at a given 
destination is the lowest possible delivered price calculated by comparing all the 
base prices and freight charges from corresponding basing points. Thus at a given 
place of destination only a single delivered price is possible, identical and known 
with precision regardless of the seller and regardless of the distance covered in 
carriage to the place of destination. 
It may thus happen that a seller applies a base price other than his own. 
In this caee, there is alignment on a competitor's base price. By systematically 
setting excessive base price, certain centres of production may find themselves 
aligning on the price of other centres for all their sales, including sales in their 
own immediate vicinity. 
On the other hand, it is inherent in the system that the freight incorporated 
in the delivered price corresponds to actual cost of carriage only if the goods are 
actually dispatched from the basing point whose base price was used for calculation 
of the delivered price. If actual costs of carriage are higher than the freight thus 
calculated, the seller is absorbing part of the freight. If it is lower, the seller 
benefits from a "phantom freight" incorporated in the delivered price. 
If the system is to work, buyers must be prohibited from taking 
responsibility for carriage in their own means of transportation or, alternatively, 
only such means of transportation as are controlled by the producers must be 
authorized, since this is the only way to ensure that at a given point of destination 
delivered prices are strictly uniform and arbitrage is impossible. 
11 2,3 Uniform fob prices (l) 
Here, the producers publish a factory price at which buyers may buy goods 
for carriage at their own expense; alternatively, if they prefer the producer to look 
after carriage, the actual cost can be added to the factory price. In any event, the 
net producer price (after deduction of freight) is the same whatever the destination 
since, at any point of delivery, the delivered price is equal to the factory price 
plus actual carriage costs. 
In a system such as this, the delivered price risee with the distance of the 
place of delivery from the factory or (if several firms are located at the same place) 
the centre of production. Each centre thus has a "natural" market where the delivered 
price of its goods is lower than that of competing centres of production (2). The 
extent of the natural market changes with each change in factory prices and carriage 
costs. Assuming carriage costs are at a given level, the only way of penetrating the 
natural market of a competitor is to cut factory prices (the same for all buyers). 
Freight absorption and phantom freight are consequently impossible. 
2.4 Fob prices with non-systematic freight absorption (3) 
In the system which we have outlined, the uniformity of factory, prices means 
that each producer must reduce his prices for all customers, either in order to obtain 
orders from places outside his natural market or in reaction to a price reduction 
announced by a neighbouring centre of production. We are thus led to imagine a hybrid 
system where buyers outside the seller's natural market could be quoted a special 
price. 
(1) This system is generally discussed alongside the basing point system : see 
main references given above. 
(2) The concept of a natural market is analyzed by Fetter (1923-24), Hoover (1936-37), 
Hyson (l950) and Greenhut (1952). 
(3) This system was put forward by Kaysen (1949), Pegrum (1951), Stocking (1954, 
p. 188) and Loescher (1959, p. 233-242). 
12 A first possibility is to charge a special factory price for distant buyers. 
But this is a purely hypothetical possibility which will not be considered here. It is 
unlikely to come about in practice since the person buying at a special price could 
resell the goods at a profit within the seller's natural market, and the seller would 
thus have to reduce his factory price for all sales. 
The alternative is a system of uniform factory prices coupled with freight 
absorption outside the natural market to counter the delivered price which the buyer 
might have obtained from a closer centre of production. The seller handles carriage 
and bears the cost of freight absorption where the sale is outside his natural market. 
The buyer always has the right to take delivery at the factory, but since factory 
prices are uniform the risk of arbitrage is excluded. The means of transport is 
selected by the buyer in a fob sale. It will be seen that this system is no more than 
a basing point system in which each factory is a basing point as far as the 
geographical structure of prices is concerned, except for one major difference : in 
this caee, buyers can choose the mode of delivery and may find it is in their 
interests to take delivery at the factory. 
It is worth adding that this fourth system is really no system at all, since 
the freedom to choose mode of transport means that prices are unlikely to become 
petrified. 
13 3, PRICE COMPETITION· 
How does the adoption of one or other of the systems described above affect 
price competition ? To put it more precisely : to what extent does the adoption of 
such a system promote price competition or help to eliminate it ? Let us also add the 
further detail that the question concerns competitive conduct in a given market 
structure. This structure is that described in the introduction : we are considering 
industries producing a relatively homogeneous product of low value per unit of weight 
requiring carriage over fairly large distances; demand is inelastic and supply is 
oligopolistic. 
3,1 Zone prices 
In a system where prices are set by area, the situation is clear and little 
discussion seems called for : the system is possible only if a geographical market 
is broken up by tacit or explicit market-sharing agreements. The logic of the system 
from the price competition angle ÌB obvious : firstly, there can be no competition 
either at the production or at the wholesale stage; secondly, buyers have no 
incentive to obtain their supplies from manufacturers nearer by· 
The system is manifestly incompatible with the common market. It is typical 
of the major cartels which segregated national territories (which were reserved for 
national cartels) and subdivided these national markets into regional markets 
(reserved for regional cartels or for this or that manufacturer); it will disappear 
with the agreements or practices through which it operates. 
I I 3,2 The basing point system 
There has been considerably more discussion of the basing point Bystem, 
Outlawed in a number of individual cases in the United States since the forties, it 
was officially adopted by Article 60 of the ECSC Treaty and applies (l) in the ooal 
and steel industries. 
This system is all the more worthy of discussion as it developed 
historically, in the United States, in a legal context where price agreements, 
particularly on a regional basis, were prohibited. This is not to suggest that the 
system cannot work under a price-fixing arrangement; it is known to have been applied 
by well-organized cartels such as the German steel cartel (2), and that it preceded 
their formation (3)» But the system is of particular interest te t» in that it could 
be the sequel to a geographical market-sharing agreement. If such an agreement were 
prohibited, would the adoption of a basing point system be apt to promote or 
facilitate competitive behaviour ? This is the question which seems most relevant to 
the European situation. 
The answer is : no, quite the contrary. The introduction of a basing point 
system as described in 2,2 above aims to create the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the success of a tacit price-fixing agreement where the structural 
situation is that which we have assumed. The necessary condition is simply the 
availability of perfect information on prices : the definition of the delivered price 
is such that any seller and any buyer can establish it with the highest degree of 
precision and a minimum amount of research. As has been stressed on a number of 
occasions, tacit agreement between members of an oligopoly is possible only where all 
the members know exactly what prices the others are charging. Where the unit value 
per unit of weight is low, carriage costs constitute a significant price factor and 
the delivered price is the subject of attention. As soon as there is any uncertainty 
as to the exact delivered price, buyers may exploit this fact to obtain secret price 
reductions and then carry out arbitrage through resale, so that general price levels 
may fall through the weakening of the geographical structure of delivered prices (4)· 
il) The way it operates in the ECSC was analysed by Stegemann (1967 or I968). 
(2) See Harbers (1953) 
(3) See, for example, Wagner (1952, p, 12), 
(4) See Adelman (1948 and 1949), Clark (1950), MestmScker (1955), LoeBcher (1955, 
p. 26-29), Schmidt (1963) and Phlips (1964). A contrary opinion on the role of 
perfect information is expressed, among others, by Demaria (1958, p. 33) and 
Menze (1963). 
15 The rule of systematic alignment is the sufficent condition which accompanies 
the information constraint. Through alignment, the effect of any price reduction by a 
competitor is automatically neutralized. Although certain appearances may be to the 
contrary, alignment thus has no competitive virtues. Although it may, at first sight, 
point to aggressive conduct, in reality it makes it impossible to undercut 
competitors'' prices. Alignment is a defensive tactic : assuming equal prices, the 
seller can tie his traditional customers to him wherever they may be located. 
It may be worth adding that a tacit agreement can be reinforced by various 
aspects of the way this system is operated, and particularly through the selection 
of basing points. The choice of a single basing point where there are several centres 
of production enables the dominant centre to impose its price leadership . The 
point might be the place where the price leader has his main factory. It can also 
correspond to the location of small, marginal and distant competitors whose natural 
markets are thought to deserve protection (while reserving the benefit of "phantom-
freight" for the main centre). But price leadership is not incompatible with the 
existence of several basing points, for basic prices can be set at such levels that 
numerous competitors are obliged to align systematically on the base price of a 
single basing point (so that other base prices never count). 
In sum, the basing point system proceeds from the same logic as the zone 
pricing system for the purposes of price competition : all uncertainty as to prices 
is to be eliminated as is all incentive to undercut competitors. It has the specific 
advantage of making tacit price agreements possible where explicit agreements are 
prohibited. 
The vaBt majority of writers on this subject agree with the foregoing 
diagnosis. While the view that a basing point system tends to sharpen competitive 
conduct is rarely held, we more frequently meet the argument (l) that this system 
develops spontaneously and inevitably in industries with high fixed costs, unstable 
demand and an oligopolistic structure. This argument is not convincing when it is 
borne in mind that the system arises from explicit agreements (frequently reached 
laboriously) and that it is not easy to keep in operation. There are numerous 
opportunities for breakdowns : at times of serious depression, the temptation to 
grant clandestine rebates(on the delivered prices resulting from the system) is 
likely to wear down adheBion to the agreement; at times of economic boom, shortage 
(l) See de Chazeau (1938) and Clark (1938) for the United States, and Möller (l943a) 
and von Beckerath (1954, p. 199-200 and 263-264), 
16 jf supply may permit sales at individual prices which are higher than those of the 
gystem; finally, and most important of all, imports from non-member countries can 
iestroy the whole system. When it does work, this fact in itself is evidence of 
intentional adhesion to a tacit price agreement. 
3.3 Uniform fob prices 
Uniform fob prices are found both where there is an organised cartel and where 
there is tacit collusion, as is the basing point system.. Although price information is 
less perfect as regards delivered prices, since buyers are using their own means of 
transport, it is perfect as regards factory prices. While the exclusion of alignment 
confines each centre of production to its own natural market, tacit price-fixing is 
fostered. 
The choice between the two formulae (l) will depend, among other things, on 
the geographical stability of demand. If demand develops along parallel lines on the 
various regional submarkets, the fob system is the simplest. Each natural market 
develops at the same rate, and market shares (or production quotas) can be 
safeguarded simply by maintaining each operator's natural market. If undesirable 
shifts in natural demarcation lines were to arise, for instance, through the 
development of new means of transport, corrections can still be made by adjusting 
differences between factory prices. On the other hand, if regional demand shifts are 
frequent and on a large scale, alignment becomes necessary and basing points with it. 
A centre for which demand is falling can then maintain its market share by supplying 
growth regions without endangering the structure of prices. 
3.4 Fob prices with non-systematic freight absorption 
Our forth system was clearly thought up in order to offset the disadvantages 
of the other systems and to provide useful reference criteria. It provides the best 
prospects for promoting competitive behaviour. 
(l) As pointed out by Stigler (1949). 
17 Firstly, freedom to choose terms of delivery and means of transport means 
that there is no certainty as to the delivered price applying at various places of 
destination. Secondly, interpénétration of natural markets remains possible but 
alignment on the local price leader is no longer compulsory nor even systematic : 
undercutting is possible. Furthermore, intermediaries could carry out arbitrage 
operations by reselling in other natural markets where this is profitable. The result 
would thus be a network of natural markets with flexible and rather blurred boundaries, 
and this, as we Bhall see below, is the salient feature of a spatially integrated 
market. 
18 THE EQUILIBRIUM OF AN ISOLATED FIRM 
The aim of the foregoing analysis was to establish to what extent different 
spatial pricing techniques encourage or discourage active price competition between 
a given number of competing firms. There is much to be gained from taking the 
analysis further and establishing to what extent these systems are profitable to 
individual firms. This section will first consider the equilibrium of an isolated 
firms which maximizes its own profit. The following section will consider the 
equilibrium of a group of competing firms. 
The spatial theory of the firm proceeds from the fact that the location of 
buyers at different places permits a policy of spatial price discrimination where 
carriage costs are not negligible. By definition there is spatial discrimination when 
a firm sets net factory prices which vary from one buyer to another according to the 
buyer's location. As this opportunity for discrimination is the specific result of 
geographical separation, the general theory of the discriminating monopoly (l) will 
not suffice on its own : the theory must be adapted to the Bpecific circumstances 
deriving from the existence of transport costs (2). 
4.1 Assumptions 
Let us take a firm which has one factory and is the only firm to sell a 
homogeneous and heavy product in a given geographical area. To simplify matters, we 
assume that in that area demand is concentrated on three geographically separated 
places and can be represented by three identical linear demand curves. These "gross" 
demands depend on delivered prices, and are to be distinguished from "net" demands 
which depend on net factory prices. 
¡1) As developed by Pigou (1929), Robinson (1933) and E.O. Edwards (1950). 
,2) The adaptation is recent, and is due to the work of Stevens and Rydell (1966), 
Greenhut and Ohta (1972) and Greenhut, Hwang and Ohta (1975)· 
19 It is worth noting from the outset that these assumptions imply no loss of 
generality. The results obtained for three demand locations can be extrapolated without 
difficulty to n locations. Furthermore, the conclusions which are of interest to us 
do not depend on the shape of the gross demand curves, so that the assumption of a 
linear curve, which considerably facilitates presentation, does not restrict the 
validity of our conclusions (l). The same applies to the assumption of identical gross 
demand curves, since it will be seen that in fact they entail differing net curves 
and that only these net curves determine the equilibrium of the firm. The assumption 
of identical gross curves makes the impact of the existence of the spatial factor on 
the firm's policy all the more visible. Evidently, the assumption becomes restrictive 
when the impact of phenomena other than transport costs comes up for analysis. 
Since any difference in the distance between the factory and places of 
demand entails differences in the net demand curves, it can also be assumed, without 
loss of generality, that these places are at equal distances from each other on a 
straight line. Let us therefore assume that demand D is at the Baine location as the 
factory, demand D.. at a certain linear distance and demand D at double that distance. 
The situation facing the firm in these circumstances is represented in graph 
form in Figure l(a). Gross demand curve D coincides with net demand curve d  °
 N ' o o 
since demand D can be satisfied without any freight being payable. Curve D , which 
represents quantities demanded as a function of the delivered price, also represents 
gross demands D.. and D„. To sum up, D = D = D since it is assumed that gross 
demand curves are identical. 
Net demand d. is obtained by drawing a straight line parallel with D , 
i 'o 
after deduction of one third of the intercept OB, the assumption being that the unit 
cost of carriage between the factory and the first distant centre of consumption is 
(1/3) OB. Net demand <¿2
 i
B obtained similarly, the cost of carriage now being 
(2/3) OB. 
Horizontal line k represents the marginal cost of production, which is 
assumed to be constant. 
(l) For a demonstration, see Greenhut and Ohta (1972). The conclusions to the contrary 
reached by Stevens and Rydell (1966) are erroneous. 
20 j FIGURE 
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tl 4.2 Non-uniform discriminatory prices 
What pricing policy will maximize profits in our firm in the circumstances 
described above ? The theory of a discriminating monopolist provides an immediate 
reply : the firm will set its prices at such levels that marginal revenues 
corresponding to average revenues d , d. and d„ will be equal to marginal cost 
k and therefore equal to each other. The demonstration of this is simple and well-
known and there is no need to reiterate it here. 
In Figure l(a), the result of this is net factory prices PQ, Pj and p^. 
As these net prices differ from each other, there is discrimination. By adding 
respective unit costs of carriage to net prices, we obtain delivered prices TTQ 
(= ρ ), π. and ΤΓ„ , which also differ. 
Two points must be made straight away. Firstly, the firm will be meeting 
demand from the three places. Secondly, it must be stressed that the difference 
between π and π is less than the cost of carriage (it is equal to half the 
cost of carriage because the demand curves are linear). The same applies to the 
difference between π„ and ir , so that the firm will find a systematic freight 
absorption policy on sales to the more distant buyers to be profitable. On the other 
hand, there is no phantom freight, since no buyer is obliged to pay a delivered price 
exceeding the sum of the net factory price and actual cost of carriage. 
The firm's total output may also be determined from Figure l(a). But we 
shall determine it rather in Figure l(b), which has the advantage of facilitating 
comparison with other pricing policies. 
Figure l(b) is constructed from the horizontal addition of demand curves 
(the usual method for the theory of discriminating monopoly). Straight line BC 
represents the horizontal sum of the three gross demand curves (D + D, + D„) and 
o 1 2 
does not interest us for the moment. Broken curve BDEA represents the horizontal sum 
of d , d, and ¿L . It is the total net demand curve which interests the firm, 
0 12 ' 
since it is defined in terms of net factory prices. 
Since there is discrimination, the marginal revenue which is of interest to 
the firm corresponds (l) to regular broken curve BFHIL. It is the point of 
intersection between this curve and marginal cost k which determines total output Q,. 
(l) See Robinson (1933). 
22 4.3 Uniform fob prices 
Where a firm has a monopoly in a given geographical area, a profitable 
policy is, as we have seen, to apply different delivered prices with freight 
absorption. Nevertheless, it may use other tactics, for instance where it is obliged 
to do so by antitrust law or by the presence of competitors in control of 
neighbouring geographical areas (l). Considerations relating to overall market 
equilibrium (taking in all the different geographical areas) may then come into play. 
We shall analyse these considerations in Section 5 ! for the moment, we shall assume 
that, for whatever reason, the relevant firm has adopted a less profitable policy 
than that of non-uniform discriminatory delivered prices. 
The first possibility is setting a uniform fob price. This price is 
determined by the point of intersection between the marginal cost and the marginal 
revenue which corresponds to curve BDEA. In this case, the marginal revenue to be 
taken into consideration is represented by zig-zag curve BFGHIJKL. Point of 
intersection N gives fob price ρ . 
It is easy enough to draw a graph establishing the loss of profit as 
against the operation of non—uniform discriminatory delivered prices. Since the 
profit of the firm is equal to the geometrical area between the marginal revenue and 
marginal cost curves and the vertical axis, the loss of profit is equal to the sum 
of triangles FGH and BJN. 
It will be seen that because it has set a fob price the firm will no longer 
be able to supply the more distant customers. Simply drawing a horizontal line at 
level ρ , and transposing it from Figure l(b) to Figure l(a), reveals that this 
price is higher than the net demand prices on d . Alternatively, we can repeat the 
same exercise by adding to pf , firstly, the cost of carriage (l/3) OB and, 
secondly, (2/3) OB. These delivered prices correspond with a non-zero quantity on 
D. and a zero quantity on D?. 
It is thus not surprising to find that total output Q- is less than total 
output Q, yielded by discrimination. This is a general result : as compared with fob 
prices, freight absorption enables more distant markets to be supplied, output to be 
raised and profits to be expanded. 
(l) As will be seen in Section 5· 
23 4,4 Uniform delivered prices 
By a uniform delivered price, we mean an identical price for a whole area -
the geographical area controlled by the firm. Here the obligation to set a uniform 
delivered price is seen as a constraint imposed on the firm, and implies a loss of 
profit as compared with the policy of non-uniform delivered prices analyzed in 
Section 4.2. The question, then, is to determine the level of the single delivered 
price which will maximize profits under this constraint. For the sake of clarity we 
shall work from Figure 2, which reproduces the main data of Figure 1, 
There are two possibilities. Firstly, we shall assume that, apart from the 
obligation to set a uniform delivered price, the firm is obliged (by law, for 
instance) to supply the entire territory, in other words to set a uniform delivered 
price for the three places of demand (including the most distant). Secondly, we 
shall assume that the firm is free to restrict the geographical area in which the 
uniform delivered price is applicable and therefore to refuse to sell outside that 
area. 
(a) Obligation to supply the entire territory 
As the firm has to set a uniform delivered price for all its three demands, 
gross total demand wurve BC is used for the analysis and determines the firms total 
output. Net total demand curve BDEA; considered above, is to be distinguished from 
straight line PA which is obtained by deducting from BC a distance reflecting 
average cost of carriage (per unit sold) c = (l/3) OB. It is this straight line PA 
which measures average revenue yielded by the various possible total quantities, and 
which may here be interpreted as a net average revenue curve. Given the same 
delivered price, the same quantity is sold at the three centres of consumption (gross 
demands being identical), so that the average revenue is equal, for each unit sold, 
to the delivered price less the average cost of transport, i.e. one third of 
0 + (l/3) OB + (2/3) OB, that is (1/3) OB. 
It is easy to show that, once again, it is the equality of marginal revenue 
and marginal cost which determines constrained maximum profits and the uniform 
delivered price π · 
u 
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(a)  (b) But this, of course, is possible only at a reduced profit. We have already 
shown that a single fob price is less profitable that non-uniform delivered prices. 
The time has come to note that a uniform delivered price applying throughout the 
territory is in its turn less profitable than a uniform fob price. This can be shown 
in graph form with the average revenue curve PA. At a uniform delivered price TTU , 
the sale of quantity Q, gives profits equal to shaded rectangle RSTU. This is smaller 
than the rectangle determined by the fob price (p ) . 
The reader may wonder whether it would not be to the firm's advantage to set 
a uniform delivered price equal to the fob price plus the average cost of carriage. 
The answer is ι no. Let us add e to pf , and find the corresponding delivered price 
on gross total demand BC. This price yields a smaller output and smaller profits. 
The same applies to any uniform delivered price above TTU . Similarly, any uniform 
delivered price lower than π yields reduced profit despite increased output. 
Let us locate uniform price ir on Figure 2(a). We find that it gives three 
different net prices (π., ρ ., ρ „) : there is discrimination. As all buyers are 
helping to cover total costs of carriage, there is both phantom freight and freight 
absorption. Buyers in the immediate vicinity of the factory are paying non-existent 
freight charges which are Lightening the burden on more distant buyers. It does not 
appear possible to determine the relative degree of freight absorption, as there is 
no net factory price to which one could refer. 
(b) Freedom to restrict the territory 
Nevertheless, close examination of Figure 2(a) will have made clear that, 
in the hypothesis under study above, the firm is selling at the third place of 
demand at a net price (Pu2) which is lower than marginal cost k , Total profits 
are therefore also lower than those obtained on a fob price sale. Consequently, the 
firm can raise its profits by restricting its territory and refusing to supply the 
most distant demand. 
If we take the two demand curves for the nearest places, the gross total 
demand curve moves from BC to BA. Let us deduct from BA a vertical distance 
reflecting the average coBt of transport, being half of (0 + (l/3) OB), in other 
words (l/6) OB. ThiB gives straight line VW, which we reproduce in Figure 2(d), 
incorporating the main data of Figure 2(b). This straight line measures net average 
revenue, and a straight line VZ, measuring marginal revenue, corresponds to it. 
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(c)  (d) The point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost corresponds to output 
Q^ (obtained with the fob price) and to a net average revenue equal to Pf ! From 
the firm's point of view, we are in the same situation as with sales at a fob price. 
Profits have risen through the restriction of the geographical territory. As for the 
uniform delivered price, it is at an intermediate level between Pf and ^u : it is 
obtained this time by adding the average cost of transport to the fob price and is 
equal to % ¿ ("free" uniform delivered price). Figure 2(c) shows that there is 
discrimination. This result is well known : it was obtained by Stevens and Rydell 
(1966) and by Beckmann (1968, p. 33-34). 
4.5 Sale at marginal coBt 
The final item for discussion is sale at factory price equal to marginal 
cost, i.e. to price Pc = & in Figure 2(b), At this price, we have zero profits and 
maximum output. This policy, which is frequently urged upon public enterprises, holds 
a central place in the theory of welfare economics, as we shall see in section 6, 
4,6 Summary and conclusions 
We have examined above the equilibrium of an isolated firm assuming a series 
of spatial price-setting techniques. We have been able to highlight the effect of 
spatial factors : the coste entailed by the geographical separation of buyers create 
possibilities of discrimination which firms find profitable, 
A policy of freight absorption appears eminently profitable, particularly 
when it gives rise to delivered prices which vary from one centre of consumption to 
another. A uniform fob price yields less profit, although greater than those profits 
yielded by a uniform delivered price, unless firms are in a position to restrict 
their Bales territory. In this caee, restriction of the territory in which the 
uniform delivered price applies, enables the same net average revenue (and therefore 
the same profits) to be obtained as a uniform fob price. 
28 Freight absorption also ensures the highest level of output (leaving aside 
sales at marginal cost) and enables buyers at the greatest distance from the place of 
production to be supplied. 
This being said, links must now be established between the pricing policies 
analysed and the four pricing systems described in section 2. 
Let us begin by stressing that the equilibrium of an isolated firm, which 
we have just analysed, gives no indication as to why an industry adopts a given 
system rather than another. In business practice, the four systems appear, and are 
often applied side-by-side, in the same industry, although the foregoing theory 
suggests that it is always profitable for a firm to set non-uniform discriminatory 
delivered prices. This amounts to saying that our analysis was incomplete, and that 
the firm must be considered in relation to its competitors. The requirements of group 
equilibrium, it seems, may induce a firm to adopt other strategies : this we shall 
see in the next section. 
Before going on, however, valuable lessons can be learnt from what we have 
already said. 
For instance, a policy of non-uniform discriminatory delivered prices which 
maximizes profits may take the form of a system of zone prices when the spatial 
configuration of demand indicates either concentration or a low degree of dispersion 
by area (as where there is one major town per area). 
The same policy may take the practical form of the adoption by a single firm 
(or a cartel) of several basing points , with base prices set at such levels that 
peripheral buyers (with relation to the place of production) benefit from freight 
absorption. 
On the other hand, systematic freight absorption, organized in the form of 
an obligation to align , seems to be fully outside the foregoing analysis. So does 
the phenomenon of occasional freight absorption, combined with a fob factory price 
in relation to distant buyers. These phenomena are linked to the state of the market, 
and in particular to competitive conditions. 
29 THE EQUILIBRIUM CF AN OLIGOPOLISTIC GROUP OF FIRMS (l) 
Let us therefore bring these competitive conditions, which refer to the 
number of competitors, their location and their production costs, into the analysis. 
In order to get results, a number of rather restrictive assumptions must unfortunately 
be made. In fact, we shall only be able to study one particular case, but our hope 
nevertheless is that it is fairly representative of spatial competition between 
oligopolies* 
5,1 Assumptions 
Let us keep the assumption of identical linear demand curves, and consider 
a given place of purchase. At this place, the gross demand curve is 
(1) π = α + ßqi (α > 0, β < 0) 
for firm t, where its unit cost of carriage to that point is t. » Equalization of 
net marginal revenue and marginal cost gives the equilibrium condition, 
(2) π + 3σ. - k. + t.. 
Let us suppose that there are m firms ( i = 1, ,,,,π ) in a position to sell at 
this buying point » The summation of these m firms gives the condition of market 
equilibrium (at one point) 
(3) m π + $Σςί = Σ/^ + Σ^, 
which, after division by m , can be rewritten as 
(l) This section waB inspired by the recent article by Greenhut and Greenhut (1975) 
30 (4) π + 3 f = k + t, 
where fe = Σ fe. /m, t = Σ t. Im and ς = Σ q>. . 
If these m firms together adopt condition (4), this condition determines 
delivered price IT . To put it another way, they decide to set their delivered price 
according to the average of their marginal costs ( κ) plus the average of their unit 
costs of carriage of the relevant point ( t ), This assumption does not seem 
incompatible with what we know about the business practices of cartels and, indeed, 
appears all the less arbitrary as spatial separation creates oligopolistic 
relationships between firms supplying the same geographical markets. In practice, 
then, m should be a fairly small number. 
To show that (4) déterminée the delivered price at any given point in space, 
rewrite (4) as 
π d + £2i) = τ + τ, 
m π 
using (l), to find (after rearrangement) that 
(5) π = _1_ (α + Æ) + JL. τ.  This equation will enable us to determine the spatial configuration of π in 
different competitive conditions from analysis of t , 
5,2 Geographic concentration of production in a single location 
The simplest case is the situation in which the competing firms are all 
located at a single centre of production. The unit cost of transport is then the same 
for all firms, and ~t = t , where t measures the unit transportation cost (or the 
distance measured in money terms) between the centre of production and any given 
place of consumption. Equation (5) becomes 
(6) π = -4r (a + mk) + -^- t  v ' m+\ m+\ 
whereas the price in the absence of transportation costs is 
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It will immediately be clear that the diagrammatic representation of π as 
as function of t gives a straight line (l) with a positive and less than unitary 
slope, since ml (m + 1) < 1 , In other words, a geographically concentrated group of 
competing firms benefits from freight absorption : only part of t is incorporated 
in the delivered price (see Figure 3). Furthermore, as the number of firms rises, so 
the price falls and the slope becomes steeper, corresponding to freight absorption at 
a lesser degree. The sales area extends up to the point where π is equal to the 
highest demand price which buyers are willing to pay, i.e. intercept α (equal to 
OB in Figures 1 and 2), 
5,3 Two centres of production in the same geographical area 
Let un render the analysis a little more complicated by supposing that the 
firms are located at two separate centres of production, and that there are m. 
firms at one centre and m2 firms at the other. Buyers are located on a line linking 
the two centres, which are separated by a distance d (see Figure 4)· 
For every purchase on that line, the transportation cost is t from centre 
I , and ( d - t ) from centre I , The average transportation cost t is 
2 
(
8)
 
t = m + „ {m.t +m0 (d- t)}. 
m. + m„ 1 ¿ 
Suppose m = m. + m7 « From equation (5), we see that the delivered prices will obey 
(9) π = ^(a + mk ) +j±Yimlt + m2(d-t)}. 
From centre Ι χ , these delivered prices rise at the constant rate 
(10
) ώ-
("Ί-V 
with distance. That is to say that, if most of the firms are located at I , and 
only a few at l^ , so that m. > m-> , delivered prices will rise in linear fashion 
(l) Greenhut and Greenhut (1975) show that the linear form of the spatial 
configuration ©f π ÍB.unrelated to the assumption of linear demand, curves. 
33 from I as in Figure 5(a). This may explain sales on single basing point (for 
instance (l) the "Pittsburg plus", "Oberhausen" and "Thionville" systems) by an entire 
industry, even by firms which are geographically distant from the principal centre of 
production taken as basing point. 
Figure 5(h) illustrates the situation where different centres of production 
are equal in size ( m = m )· Here, it is in the industry's interest to adopt a 
uniform delivered price , the curve representing π being horizontal. 
5,4 Spatial variations in competitive conditions 
From the foregoing results, the reader may imagine a variety of more 
complicated practical situations, and in particular work out the spatial 
configuration of delivered prices in situations where the geographical areas which 
can be supplied by the centres of production overlap only partly. 
For instance, two centres of production may be in competition only in a 
central area on each side of which one of the centres of production has a sales 
monopoly. The delivered price schedule will then turn out to be a combination of 
three straight lines with different slopes, which vary with the number of 
competitors in each of the areas. 
Figure 6 illustrates the spatial configuration of ττ which maximizes profits 
for two centres of production which have agreed to set their prices on the terms 
described at section 5·!· 
Centre I has two firms and is therefore more important than I where 
there is only one firm. If centre I did not exist, the first centre would control 
the geographical area which extends right up to point D, If centre 1 did not 
exist, the second centre would control the area from I to A, The fact that they 
both exist narrows the area down to Y for I , and to Ζ for I , The natural 
market of centre I extends only up to Y, where its delivered price is equal to 
the marginal coet at I plus transportation cost. The natural market of £2 
(l) An historical description of the operation of these systems by American, German 
and French steelmakers is given by Zimmermann (1962, p. 209—235). 
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35 extends right up to Z, where its delivered price is equal to k plus the 
transportation cost from I 
Between Y and Z, it is the larger centre which sets delivered prices, 
following a straight line with a steeper slope (2 - l)(2 + l) = l/3. In this area, 
centre I must accept decreasing delivered prices as the distance to the point of 
sale rises. 
This may explain why maximization of aggregate profits may entail alignment 
on a competitor's delivered price (meeting competition). Such alignments may take place 
only occasionally. However, to avoid a collapse of the geographical structure of prices 
described in Figure 6, particularly where there are geographical shifts in demand or 
recessions, the industry as a whole stands to gain by institutionalizing alignment, 
i»e, by adopting the rule of systematic alignment , which is the most important 
feature of sales from multiple basing points. 
36 6. SOCIAL WELFARE; 
Although they are somewhat rudimentary, the assumptions made in the 
preceding section help to make for an understanding of the logic of the chief epatial 
pricing techniques. The time has come to evaluate these techniques in the light of 
welfare economics. We have seen that systematic spatial discrimination ensures 
maximum output, since it enables distant customers to be proepected. One is tempted 
to deduce (l) that this is therefore the best policy from the point of view of 
social welfare. This section aims to demonstrate that the deduction is both hasty 
and erroneous. 
6,1 Net social benefit 
A first-partial-approach works from the concept of net social benefit, which 
is equal to the "consumer surplus" minus the corresponding cost of production. If the 
demand curve is expressed as ττ = f (q) , as above, the consumer surplus is measured 
by the area under that curve, from the vertical axis, to the price set by the firm ; 
for this area measures the sum of money which consumers would be willing to pay 
rather than go without the relevant goods. 
Consider the case of a firm with a monopoly in a given geographical area, 
with no outside competitors , This was the situation analyzed in section 4« Holohan 
(1975) shows that, in this case, spatial discrimination provides a greater consumer 
surplus than a uniform fob price. The mathematical demonstration of this is rather 
laborious and would overburden this report. But an intuitive demonstration can be 
given from Figure 7, which represents the spatial evolution of delivered prices (as 
a function of t ) under the various pricing techniques analysed in Figures 1 and 2, 
(l) As suggested by Greenhut and Ohta (1972) and Greenhut and Greenhut (1975)· 
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38 First, compare non-uniform discriminatory delivered prices ( ττ, ) with 
delivered prices derived from a uniform fob price ( irf ), The former are lower than 
the latter from distance OV, Consumers located in the immediate vicinity of the 
factory pay a higher price if there is discrimination (π > pf ), Those located at 
distance (l/3) OB benefit from a discriminatory delivered price ( ir. < π. ) which is 
lower than the fob price plus cost of carriage ( ττ = pf + t ), so that some 
compensation is possible. But customers located at distance (2/3) OB gain in welfare 
from discriminatory price ττ2 , whereas, at that distance, price irf , derived from 
adding the cost of carriage to the fob price, would be prohibitive (IT > a ). In sum, 
then, there is a net gain. 
Now compare non-uniform discriminatory delivered price ( π. ) with uniform 
delivered prices, assuming the latter to be applied throughout the geographical area 
(π ), In the immediate vicinity of the factory, the former is lower than the latter; 
at the most distant place of demand, the opposite situation obtains; half way between 
the two places, π = π , As the positive and negative gaps compensate each other, 
the two policies appear to have equivalent effect, except that the uniform price is 
more favourable to distant customers and less favourable to those nearer by. 
The uniform price (π ), applied throughout the geographical area, 
consequently entails a net gain as compared with delivered prices derived from a 
uniform fob price ( irf ). 
As for the uniform price ( π 7 ), obtained where firms are in a position 
to refuse to supply the most distant buyers, it is equal to π, at distance OV, The 
upward difference at the factory is equal to the downward difference at distance 
(1/3) OB which is the boundary of the sales territory : this policy is equivalent to 
selling as a uniform fob price under the approach taken so far. 
At first sight, then, and this is an argument frequently advanced in 
industrial circles (l), geographical discrimination (through the setting of prices 
π, or π ) is beneficial to the community at large, as a result of freight 
absorption benefiting distant buyers. But let us stress that this argument holds 
good only in the absence of competition. 
(l) See, for instance, Herlemann (1950, P« 54-59) and Semler (1963, p. 435) on 
uniform delivered prices, and Demaria (1958, ρ, 81-82) and Fallon (1958, p. 231) 
on the basing point system. 
39 As soon as competitors appear in the same geographical area, the opposite 
conclusions are obtained. If, as in Section 5, w
e assume that competitors are present 
on the market, the whole of the industry will, as we have shown, find it profitable to 
adopt discriminatory prices (whether uniform or not). And these are the prices which 
must be compared with fob prices. 
The model to be used, now that competition is assumed, is that which 
Beckmann (1968, 1970, 197l) called "spatial monopolistic competition". The use. of this 
model unfortunately entails rather cumbersome calculations, since analytical solutions 
have not yet been devised, so that computer simulations are necessary, as in Holahan 
(1975). Lot us simply note that uniform fob prices ensure greater output (per firm) 
and greater consumer welfare (surplus) (per geographical area) than discriminatory 
prices. The same conclusion can, incidentally, be obtained by another more elegant 
and more general approach based on the Pareto optimum, which we shall now consider. 
6.2 The Pareto optimum 
The theorems of welfare economics usually relate to a non-spatial economy. 
Such an economy is Pareto—optimal when, at the same time and for the same pricing 
system, the marginal rates of substitution between any given pair of goods are equal 
for all consumers, the marginal rates of substitution between any pair of factors 
and products are equal for all firms, and marginal rates of transformation between 
any factor and any oommodity are equal for all firms using that factor and 
manufacturing that commodity. Such an optimum is defined for a given income 
distribution, and no value judgment on that income distribution is therefore 
possible from it. As long as consumers and producers make their choices independently 
of each other, and assuming the market is not saturated, any competitive equilibrium 
is a Pareto optimum, and vice versa. Competitive equilibrium arises where, each market 
being in equilibrium, all consumers maximize their utility and all producers 
maximize their profits (l). Perhaps it is worth adding that by competitive 
equilibrium we do not necessarily mean pure and perfect competition. The existence of 
a non-collusive production oligopoly may be compatible with the concept (2). 
(1) This is discussed more throughly by Koopmans (1957, Chapter ï), 
(2) As demonstrated by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), 
40 These theorems can be applied to a spatial economy only to the extent that 
the spatial element is correctly integrated. From the outset the definition of goods 
has to be enlarged and we must stress, with Debreu (1966, p, 33), that "a good in one 
place and the same good in another place are different economic objects and it is 
vital to specify the place where the good is available", A ton of steel manufactured 
in Oberhausen and delivered in Frankfurt, and the same ton of steel delivered in 
Munich are to be regarded as distinct products for economic purposes. 
The equilibrium price of these various ^'goods'' being given, firms will 
choose to manufacture the good or goods whose price is highest (and will thereby 
maximize profits) (l). Firms produce "distant" goods (goods for sale at a distance 
from the place of manufacture) only if they can be sold at a net price which is at 
least as high as the price of the "nearest" good (in other words the net price 
obtained on a sale at the place of manufacture). Freight absorption is thus 
incompatible with a competitive equilibrium and thence with a Pareto 
optimum. All sales are thus at fob prices : firms supply distant customers only if 
the customers bear all costs of carriage. And if, by way of hypothesis, it were 
necessary to sell at discriminatory delivered prices (whether uniform or not), firms 
would sell only at one place,namely the place where their plant is located. 
The foregoing reasoning considers the properties of competitive equilibrium 
and deduces that optimal allocation is incompatible with sales at discriminatory 
delivered prices. The same result van be obtained by direct analysis of the optimum, 
as is shown by Mougeot (2) (1975, Chapter 2) in a recent work in which he generalizes 
a model by Negishi (i960). 
In addition to the constraint of a given income distribution, Mougeot adds 
a number of constraints reflecting the spatial nature of the economy. Features of the 
economy then include fixed location of economic agents, and regional availabilities 
of given factors. Transportable resources, whose utilization involves using the 
services of a transport firm and therefore payment of transport costs, are 
distinguished from fixed resources which can be used only locally. There are n 
markets, with a variable number of consumers, located in n regions (defined as 
points in space to simplify analysis), and m transportable goode, These goods can be 
produced in each of the regions by a variable number of multiproduct firms, and are 
taken to the user by a carrier. 
£l) The rest of this paragraph was inspired by Thisse (1975, P« 69-75)· 
.2) Takayama and Judge (l97l) obtained similar results. 
41 The properties of the optimum are worked out by maximization of the vector 
of individual utilities 
(11) (U, ... U_ , U ... U , ... U ) 
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is the ordinal index of utility for consumer g. residing at place j , and q 
J 64 
represents the quantity of good i consumed by individual g. residing at j. 
The vector (ll) is to be maximized to a series of constraints expressing 
the equilibrium of the market at each place and for each good (including transport 
services), the technological constraints on production and transportation and the 
regional endowments oí transportable and non—transportable factors of production. 
This maximization, incidentally, in no way implies interpersonal comparisons. 
To solve this problem, we use the Kuhn-Tucker theorem which considers it 
equivalent to a new problem where the maximization of vector (ll) is replaced by 
maximization of a linear combination of its components, 
W Σ Σ α . U , 
where the α are interpreted as the inverse of the marginal utility of income of 
consumer g. 1 Expression (13) can be interpreted as a social welfare function. The 
value of weights α reflect the income distribution. 
The maximization of the Lagrangian, composed of the sum of (13) and of these 
constraints, a raultiplier(dual variable) being associated with each constraint, gives 
a set of conditions which redefine the Pareto optimum in a spatial context. This 
really is a redefinition and not just a second best optimum (describing the least 
undesirable situation possible, the true optimum being out of reach). In other words, 
it is recognieed that the conditions of the non-spatial optimum, outlined at the 
beginning of this section, are generally inapplicable in a spatial context, and the 
problem is redefined through the explicit introduction of spatial differentiation. 
Of the conditions which are valid in a spatial context, let us consider 
only those which are of direct interest to our problem. The first relates to the 
consumer optimum and is written 
12 3u au 
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where ττ. is the dual variable associated with the market equilibrium constraint 
and can be interpreted as the price of good i at place j. 
Equations (14) express this alternative : either good i is bought by 
individual g, in which case the product of its marginal utility by coefficient aw 
is equal to the price; or this product is less than that price and the good is not 
bought. 
Consequently, the price system no longer has that property of unity which 
is a feature of the non-spatial model : 
"prices vary with location, but at each place there is a single system. In practice 
there are as many systems as markets, so there are η price systems. The unity of the 
price system therefore depends exclusively on the unity of the market. As soon as 
distance is taken into consideration, a single market is inconceivable and prices 
therefore vary from place to place." (Mougeot (1975), P· 114)· 
If, at each place, all the properties of the non-spatial optimum are found (equality 
for all individuals of the marginal rates of substitution), it is not possible to 
define an overall optimum (which would imply a single price system). The optimum 
defined here can therefore only be relative, in other words depend on a given income 
distribution and on the geographical distribution of natural resources and productive 
equipment. 
As for the production optimum, all the classical conditions of the optimum 
are evidently found when the place of production and place of consumption are the 
same : the sale is at marginal cost so that marginal rates are equal between firms. 
Where the place of production and place of consumption are not the same, so that a 
firm located in region h may sell good i in any region j : 
"the price of that good at j is equal to the sum of the marginal cost of transport 
from h to j and the marginal cost of production. Where the price on the outside 
market is lower than the sum of these marginal costs, the good is not sold". 
(Mougeot, 1975, P. 118). 
We may conclude that economic efficiency demands that spatial differentiation of 
products caused by transport costs be fully reflected in delivered prices. 
43 PERFECT MARKETS 
The implications of welfare economics, reformulated to take account of 
spatial features, can usefully be highlighted in a discussion of the concept of a 
"perfect market". They help to reveal the fallacious nature of the argument put 
forward by certain writers, most of them apparently European (l), to the effect that 
the unity of the price is an element of market perfection (2), even in a spatial 
context. 
The argument is that discriminatory delivered price systems (uniform zone 
delivered prices, multiple basing points with alignment) guarantee price unityf either 
throughout an entire geographical area or at every possible geographical location, so 
that that form of market imperfection which results from the incorporation of actual 
transport costs into delivered prices can be eliminated. The systems further guarantee 
perfect market information. 
This argument is highly speculative and depends on a clever interplay of 
concepts. Originally, the elements of perfection (perfect information, price unity, 
standardization, etc..,) described the conditions for the smooth operations of a 
stock exchange or an organized commodities market. When it is elevated to the level 
of a model, and associated with atomistic perfect competition, the concept of a 
perfect market then becomes a normative criterion and reality has at all costs to be 
adjusted to it. 
In the industrial structures which we are considering, this concept is 
highly irrelevant, since it ceases to be a condition of smooth operation. In Section 
3, we saw that perfect information must be removed from the list of criteria of 
perfection where the market is oligopolistic, the product is of low unit value and 
the price elasticity of demand is low. Welfare economics show that the same applies 
(1) See, for example, Schneider (1934 and 1938). Möller (1941, p. 28-29; 1943a and b), 
Mund (1948, p. 238-242), Sauermann (195I-52), Justman (1958) and Semler (1968). 
(2) For criticism of this concept, see, for instance, Clark (1950, p. 416-420 and 
459-460), Hahn (1953, p. 97-98), Erb (1956, p. 67), Allais (1958. p. 524-524), 
Byé (1958), Guitton (1958), Phlips (1962a, p. 8O-87). 
44 to price unity. Where there is spatial differentiation because sellers and buyers are 
not at the same place and transport costs per unit are high, economic rationality 
demands that this differentiation be reflected in prices. 
The implications of this principle are clear. Consider the zone price 
system, A uniform delivered price covering a whole area does not reflect spatial 
differentiation : the most distant buyers are given better treatment than those 
nearer to the centre of production because of the systematic freight absorption. 
There is systematic discrimination against well-located buyers. This is not 
compatible with economic efficiency. 
Let us now look at the basing point system. In a market which has several 
centres of production, it would be absurd to call for introduction of a single basing 
point by refering to the model of a single-price perfect market. Not only would this 
give maximum encouragement to a price leadership policy, as we have already seen; but 
also, peripheral centres of production (with regards to the basing point) would 
artificially benefit from phantom freight to the detriment of buyers located in their 
vicinity. The latter would thus be the subject of systematic discrimination. 
What about a system with several basing points ? Here, location would be 
more adequately reflected in delivered prices. But systematic alignment in its turn 
implies systematic discrimination because of the systematic freight absorption. 
It is evident that spatial differentiation is best reflected in prices set 
on a uniform fob basis. Even then, it should not be deduced that the fob system would 
create a perfect parket in the structural context which is being considered, for the 
total exclusion of isolated price reductions would be damaging to active price 
competition. 
Ultimately, it seems more prudent and more realistic to abandon the concept 
of a perfect market, which leads to dogmatism and misunderstandings. 
45 8. THE QUANTITATIVE INTERPENETRATION OF MARKETS 
Even if discriminatory delivered prices are not compatible with efficient 
resource allocation, should it not at least be recognised that they enable firms to 
supply more distant markets and thereby to develop trade ? And should it not be 
stressed that uniform fob prices would isolate firms in their natural markets ? Should 
these delivered price systems therefore not be regarded as a means of promoting the 
integration of markets in the European Communities trough better quantitive 
interpénétration ? And, in its turn, surely this interpénétration is the best 
means of contributing to the development of regions at considerable distance 
from the major centres of production ? 
8.1 The development of trade 
Let us begin by making it clear that the development of trade is not an end 
in itself. Trade is worthwhile only if it contributes to greater welfare through better 
resource allocation. 
The next point is that, far from developing trade, the delivered price 
systems rather tend to hamper it. In practice, uniform delivered prices operate only 
within strictly limited and segregated areas where competing firms agree both on 
prices and on output levels. As for the basing point system, the defensive character 
of the alignment rule (emphasised in Section 3.2), whatever its appearance, enables 
market-sharing arrangements to be preserved without the need for price warfare (l), 
(l) Mr A. Coppe, member of the High Authority of the ECSC, addressing the Consultative 
Committee, put it this way : "Because producers heve been granted the unlimited 
right to align their prices on those of their competitors, the customer may remain 
tied to his traditional supplier, since from him he can generally obtain the best 
possible terms obtainable on the price lists of other suppliers. Certain users, 
strategically placed between two different basing points, can obtain discounts 
under this system. But the result of alignment is to freeze all price lists and 
all trade flows." (Quoted in L'usine nouvelle . No 40, 1 October 1953 p. 3). 
16 In the common market, this aspect of the basing point system takes on 
special importance. Where the former frontiers of areas drawn up by the international 
cartels do not correspond to the boundaries of natural markets, as where, for 
instance, they are drawn along political frontiers, the adoption of the fob price 
system could lead to uncomfortable changes (all changes are uncomfortable) in market 
shares. Producers might then prefer to adop the basing point Bystem in place of the 
cartel, so as to benefit from the alignment rule. Apart from its defensive nature, 
this rule offers firms the advantage of permitting greater flexilibility in any 
adjustments of gaps between national prices. 
Paradoxically, perhaps, it is this same defensive nature which in customs 
unions preserves those trade flows which were created by former national protective 
measures in too small territorial areas. For instance, suppose that certain 
industries in the Benelux had managed to enter markets far away from their national 
markets because they had surplus capacity after meeting national demand. The 
alignement rule will then make it possible to avoid reducing exports to other 
Community Member States although this might be the result of reestablishing natural 
market s. 
8.2 Cross-hauling 
A related point is that discriminatory delivered price systems involve 
cross-hauling - useless carriage operations because of the excessive 
interpénétration of markets. We really do mean excessive interpénétration. As active 
competition involves a certain degree of interpénétration, writers stress that it is 
very difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the volume of cross—hauling. 
Nevertheless, the argument develops as follows (l). 
Interpénétration tends to develop at times of recession, or when demand 
does not rise in step with expansion in production capacity. To maintain their market 
shares without reducing their prices, firms are obliged to penetrate geographical 
areas where they have to absorb a growing proportion of freight. This is true in 
both directions. In boom times, firms endeavour to maintain their business relations 
in less profitable areas so as to protect themselves against local or temporary drops 
in demand. With the passage of time, this excessive interpénétration tends to become 
(1) See Loescher (1959, p. 208-213). 
17 permanent. In addition to the cost of cross-hauling, there are growing sales expenses 
for, in order to tie down customers who cannot be offered better price terms, firms 
have to develop marketing services, offering indirect benefits (such as the 
preparation of plans and design, or siting and distribution studies, distribution of 
informat ion, etc.). 
This reasoning is probably of general validity. In the case of the 
European Communities, it can be applied to interpénétration within the major member 
countries. But it is difficult to see how, in the short-term at any rate, it can be 
applied to trade between EEC countries, where the problem is how to eliminate national 
or regional market-sharing agreements. But there are industries, such as the ECSC 
industries, where trade between Member States is on a large scale. Here, cross-hauling 
may be the result of frozen trade flows corresponding to traditional locations. In 
this case the argument has to be related directly to what was said above about the 
freezing of trade flows. 
Finally, there is one implication of the optimality conditions which must 
be noted : following von Böventer (1962), Mougeot (1975» P« 121-122) shows that, in 
an optimal situation, trade can flow in one direction only (l) : carriage of a factor 
from one place to another should only be in one direction at a time. 
8.3 Distant regions 
When trade flows are frozen, locations are also frozen. Although they 
neutralize geographical barriers, delivered price systems also neutralize 
geographical advantages and reduce the incentives for firms to improve their 
location. 
For instance, they discourage the siting of new plant in regions where 
demand is developing, and they curb the entry of new competitors. How is a new firm 
to become established if potential customers are certain they can still obtain 
supplies from their traditional suppliers at the same price ? And if the new firm did 
endeavour to operate an independent pricing policy, the predatory establishment of a 
(l) For a formal analysis of spatial trade equilibrium, see Enke (1951), Samuelson 
(1952), Fox (1953), Fox and Tauber (1955) and Takayama and Judge (l97l). 
18 special area price or of a basing point in that region would quickly discourage it. 
This would reduce to its prospects for development and those, consequently, of the 
region. 
If prices, trade flows and locations remain unchanged, it is probable that 
buyers in distant regions will ultimately pay prices which are higher than those which 
would emerge from a system in which each existing or potential manufacturer, 
intermediary, carrier or consumer can take advantage of his geographical location. 
Only the freedom to buy fob, with the concomitant freedom to transport the goods 
oneself, offers this possibility. 
49 9. REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS 
In all that has been said so far, it has been assumed that sellers and 
buyers were located at determined places. The time has now come to drop this 
restrictive assumption and to consider the potential impact of spatial pricing 
techniques on location changes, and thence on regional development. 
As regards the adaptation of the sellers' location to the regional 
development of demand, it is clear that the uniform fob system ensures the quickest 
adaptation through the establishment of new plant in regions where demand is 
expanding. The geographic dispersion of centres of production is thus promoted (l). 
Any formula which allows for freight absorption favours traditional locations, and 
thus makes for geographical concentration. This was described in the previous section 
and there is no need to return to the point. 
Let us rather consider the potential effect of geographical pricing systems 
on the location of buyers. The problem arises particularly where buyers are themselves 
manufacturers, and process a basic product sold under this or that pricing system. 
Here, a distinction mut be drawn. 
It would seem that uniform delivered prices should deprive the buyer of 
any interest in locating his factory near that of the manufacturer of the basic 
product. Geographical dispersion of demand ÌB therefore encouraged (at the cost, of 
course, of a less perfect spatial allocation of resources). 
Under a system of uniform fob prices the buyer, ceteris paribus, will 
find it worth establishing himself near the centre of production of the basic 
product. However, since the system guarantees rapid geographical adaptation of the 
production of the basic product, the dispersion of production ultimately entails 
dispersion of demand. 
In constrast, the establishment of a basing point system is apt to spark 
off a cumulative process of geographic concentration of buyers around the basing 
(l) See, for instance, Greenhut (1963, p. I86-I91). 
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51 point of the dominant centre of production (which is usually the oldest centre as 
well) (1). 
The process is particularly clear in the case of a single basing point · 
Suppose that a basio product is manufactured at two centres of production I and 
l„ , and that processing industries are located at the same centres (half at each). 
For some reason I is taken as basing point (see Figure 8). Delivered prices 
consequently rise from I to I . 
The cost of production is the same at the two centres (let us assume 500 Frs. 
per ton) and equal to the base price 500 Frs, at I . The cost of carriage between 
the two centres is 100 Frs, per ton for the basic product. The delivered price at 
l2 (π,) is 600 Frs. 
Suppose that processing industries place half their orders for the basic 
product with each centre, so that each of the centres is on an equal footing. The 
result is an average net price of 500 Frs. both at I and at I . Centre I 
receives 600 Frs. per ton on local sales and 400 Frs. on sales at I . (This, of 
course, assumes that demand is higher at I , which is unrealistic but essential if 
the two centres are to produce identical amounts») 
Suppose that the cost of processing the basic product is the same at both 
centres (100 Frs, per ton). The unit cost of carriage of the processed product from 
one centre to the other is 110 Frs, The cost of the processed product is 500 + 100 = 
600 Frs at I , and 600 + 100 = 700 Frs. at I . Processors at ι cannot sell at 
£„ for the cost of carriage is prohibitive. A fortiori, processors at ι cannot 
sell at I . Each centre thus has a monopoly on itB local market. 
At first sight, due to the assumption that demand is higher at j , the 
choice of basing point does not affect the location of processors. But, in fact, 
opportunities are not equal. To illustrate this, let us introduce a third market for 
the processed product at I . The cost of carriage of 1>he processed product from 
the first two centres to l^ is the same, say 110 Frs. per ton. Nevertheless, only 
processors located at the basing point for the basic product will be able to sell at 
¿3 , since their delivered prices at l^ are 600 + 110 = 710 Frs., as against 
700 + 110 = 810 Frs. for processors located at l2 . Processors therefore have a 
(l) Here we are taking over the argument by Stocking (1954, and particularly Appendix 
A), correcting the analysis of Isard and Capron (1949). 
52 clear intereet in location near the basing point for the basic product, ThiB, in its 
turn, promotes expansion of basic product production capacity at the basing point, 
and destroys that equality of opportunities which was assumed at the outset. For as 
long as a single basing point is maintained at I. , the process is irreversible and 
cumulative. 
What, then, is the situation in a multiple basing point system ? If each 
centre of production has its own basing point, and if there are no price fixing 
agreements, the system creates no distortion. But these ifs are highly unrealistic. 
In practice, the system is designed to reinforce a price-fixing agreement and to 
safeguard the interests of the dominant centres. These centres will impose a 
geographical price structure of such a nature that delivered prices will rise with 
distance from the dominant centre. Peripheral centres will be forced to operate base 
prices which are at least as high as those of the basing point, even if their 
production costs are lower» The typical spatial configuration of prices is then as 
described in Figure 6, The same cumulative concentration process works in favour of 
the geographical area where the dominant basing point is located. This area tends to 
be an intensely and traditionally industrialized one» 
53 10. CONCLUSIONS 
This study has revealed that an isolated firm selling its goods in a 
spatial context maximizes profits by setting non-uniform discriminatory delivered 
prices involving freight absorption to the benefit of more distant buyers. 
If, then, firms adopt one of the spatial pricing techniques which we have 
considered, for instance by fixing uniform delivered prices, by determining 
delivered prices from basing points or by selling at uniform fob prices, this cannot 
be explained but by the fact that several competing firms are in business in the 
same geographical area. 
Our study also makes it abundantly clear that these spatial pricing 
techniques cannot be interpreted as sales conditions resulting from the trade usage 
of certain regions or certain industries, and neutral with regard to active 
competition and economic efficiency. In reality, they have a profound impact. Any 
antitrust policy which claims to be effective will ignore these techniques at its 
peril. 
The fact is that, from the point of view of active price competition, 
techniques which involve freight absorption and are therefore discriminatory, such 
as salee at uniform delivered prices, sales based on a single basing point and sales 
based on multiple basing points with alignment, turn out to be the indispensable 
foundations for price agreements designed to preserve a spatial configuration of 
delivered prices »Meli maximizes joint profits. In oligopolistic industries producing 
heavy goods of low innit valine, these systems indicate the existence of tacit price-
fixing agreements, fluey shorald Ise prohibited if the prohibition of price-fixing 
agreements is to woik» Otherwise, explicit price—fixing agreements will be replaced 
by tacit agreements wDtrikaMe thmomgh the perfection of information and through the 
freight absorption nales which characterize these systems. 
Prosi the point ©f view ©f econome efficiency, only sales at fob prices are 
compatible with the efficient spatial allocation of resources, whether the analysis 
be based on given locations, or new locations be taken into·, account. 
54 However, the adoption of a fob price system would not by itself achieve 
optimum allocation. It is further necessary that prices be brought down to the level 
of marginal costs, and this can be done only through active price competition. Yet 
a system of fob prices does not ensure active price competition. 
Accordingly, we do not recommend the system of binding uniform fob prices. 
We would prefer a hybrid system, combining sales at fob prices with possible 
occasional freight absorption. In such a system, special attention would be paid to 
ensuring that buyers, and particularly processors and intermediaries, are able to buy 
at fob prices and to choose between different means of transport, while producers 
are able to grant isolated price reductions through occasional freight absorption. 
In such conditions, perfect information, the availability of which is essential to 
tacit price-fixing, can no longer be had, and active price competition can reemerge. 
The result will be an economic structure reflecting the costs linked to spatial 
differentiation and, in the longer run, the spatial allocation of resources will be 
made more efficient through the establishment of new plants and geographical 
de concent rat ion » 
Unfortunately, it cannot be asserted that a prohibition on delivered price 
systems will suffice to ensure real active price competition. The human imagination 
is boundless, and would no doubt dream up other means of reestablishing that 
unimpeded flow of information which is indispensable to price maintenance. However, 
the means to do this will be all the more difficult to find as the freedom to buy fob, 
combined with the freedom to sell at delivered prices, will be guaranteed in the sales 
conditions. 
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